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DragonForce Ransomware Technical Analysis and Availability of a Decryptor

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Updated March 21, 2026 at 02:51 PM2 sources
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DragonForce Ransomware Technical Analysis and Availability of a Decryptor

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Security researchers published a technical breakdown of DragonForce ransomware, a ransomware operation that evolved from early underground forum activity into a broader ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) model targeting both Windows and VMware ESXi environments. Reporting attributes DragonForce’s code lineage to leaked LockBit 3.0 and Conti code, with a custom build that heavily obfuscates strings and supports flexible encryption modes across local disks and network shares. Observed intrusion tradecraft includes initial access via exposed remote services (notably RDP), followed by lateral movement tooling such as Cobalt Strike and SystemBC, culminating in encryption of file servers and virtual machines and pressure via a dark web presence advertising stolen data.

S2W’s analysis describes DragonForce’s cryptography and operator options, including ChaCha8 for file encryption with RSA-4096 key protection, command-line flags to select local vs network targeting and partial-encryption ratios, and optional behaviors such as Base32-encoding original filenames and changing icons/wallpaper. Critically, S2W reports obtaining a working decryptor for certain DragonForce cases on both platforms: the Windows decryptor targets files with the .RNP extension, while the ESXi decryptor checks for .RNP_esxi files and a specific 8-byte magic value (build_key), potentially enabling recovery without ransom payment for affected victims. Separate reporting on DeadLock ransomware describes a different operation using Polygon smart contracts to rotate proxy infrastructure and is not part of the DragonForce activity.

Timeline

  1. Jan 14, 2026

    S2W publishes technical analysis and obtains DragonForce decryptors

    On January 14, 2026, S2W published a detailed analysis of DragonForce ransomware, describing a custom build with heavy string obfuscation, ChaCha8 and RSA-4096 encryption, and configurable targeting options. S2W also reported obtaining working decryptors for both Windows and ESXi variants, which could help some victims recover without paying ransom.

  2. Jan 14, 2026

    DragonForce evolves into a RaaS operation targeting Windows and ESXi

    Following its initial forum activity, DragonForce developed into a full ransomware-as-a-service operation targeting both Windows systems and VMware ESXi environments. Its payload was reported to be derived from leaked LockBit 3.0 and Conti code and used for rapid encryption of local disks and network shares.

  3. Dec 1, 2023

    DragonForce first appears on BreachForums

    DragonForce was first observed in December 2023 on BreachForums, where it advertised stolen data and presented itself as a cartel-style ransomware operation. This marked the earliest known public emergence of the group.

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