Open VSX Registry Supply-Chain Attack Spreads GlassWorm via Compromised VSCode Extensions
A supply-chain compromise of the Open VSX Registry led to malicious updates being pushed to legitimate Visual Studio Code extensions after attackers gained access to a developer’s publishing credentials (likely via a leaked token or other unauthorized access). Reporting indicates four established extensions from the oorzc publisher were trojanized and distributed via Open VSX before being removed, with prior legitimate adoption measured in the tens of thousands of downloads and subsequent exposure affecting downstream developer environments.
The injected payload delivered the GlassWorm malware/loader, which executes via obfuscated JavaScript embedded in the extension and includes environment checks (notably avoiding execution on Russian-locale systems). Technical details describe a multi-stage loader with capabilities aligned to credential and data theft, including macOS credential and cryptocurrency wallet targeting, and use of techniques such as EtherHiding to retrieve command-and-control infrastructure dynamically; defenders are advised to identify and remove affected extension versions and review developer endpoints for signs of compromise and credential/token leakage.
Timeline
Feb 2, 2026
Open VSX confirmed unauthorized publishing access and removed releases
After notification from Socket, the Eclipse Foundation/Open VSX confirmed unauthorized access to the publisher's publishing resources. The registry revoked the publisher's tokens and removed the malicious releases, with one extension reportedly removed entirely because it had multiple malicious releases.
Feb 2, 2026
Socket disclosed the Open VSX supply-chain attack
Researchers at Socket reported that the malicious Open VSX updates delivered the GlassWorm malware loader via a compromised developer account rather than fake packages. Their analysis linked the campaign to macOS-focused credential and crypto theft, runtime decryption, and command-and-control retrieval via Solana transaction memos.
Jan 30, 2026
Four long-standing Open VSX extensions were trojanized
On January 30, 2026, attackers used unauthorized access to the trusted publisher account "oorzc" to publish malicious updates to four previously legitimate Open VSX extensions. The extensions had been benign for about two years and had accumulated more than 22,000 downloads before the malicious releases.
Oct 31, 2025
GlassWorm activity first observed in developer ecosystems
GlassWorm activity was first observed in late October 2025, with reporting later describing it as an ongoing campaign affecting developer environments and spreading through malicious extensions. Earlier waves were associated with typosquatting and brandjacking before the Open VSX incident.
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