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ClickFix Social Engineering Campaigns Using Terminal Commands to Install Stealers

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Updated March 31, 2026 at 11:06 AM8 sources
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ClickFix Social Engineering Campaigns Using Terminal Commands to Install Stealers

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Multiple reports highlighted ClickFix-style social engineering that convinces users to paste attacker-supplied commands into a terminal, leading to infostealer installation. Malwarebytes documented a macOS lure impersonating CleanMyMac via cleanmymacos[.]org, where victims are instructed to run a Terminal command that prints a reassuring message, decodes a hidden (base64) destination, and then downloads and executes a remote shell script via zsh. The resulting payload installs SHub Stealer, which targets saved passwords, browser data, Apple Keychain contents, Telegram sessions, and cryptocurrency wallets; it can also tamper with wallet applications (e.g., Exodus, Atomic Wallet, Ledger Live) to enable later theft of recovery phrases.

Microsoft threat intelligence (as reported by The Hacker News) described a parallel Windows ClickFix campaign that shifts from the traditional Run-dialog paste to Windows Terminal (wt.exe) using the Win + X → I shortcut, exploiting the tool’s administrative legitimacy to reduce suspicion and evade detections tuned to Run-dialog abuse. In that chain, users paste a hex-encoded/XOR-compressed command that spawns additional Terminal/PowerShell stages to decode scripts, download a ZIP payload plus a legitimate-but-renamed 7-Zip binary, extract additional components, establish persistence via scheduled tasks, configure Microsoft Defender exclusions, and ultimately deploy Lumma Stealer (including use of QueueUserAPC() for injection).

Timeline

  1. Mar 31, 2026

    Moonlock reports recruiter-themed ClickFix targeting VC and fintech talent

    By March 31, 2026, Moonlock Lab documented a ClickFix campaign targeting crypto, Web3, blockchain, VC, and fintech professionals through fake LinkedIn recruiter personas, Calendly links, and spoofed Zoom or Google Meet pages. The campaign used fake verification prompts to copy OS-specific Terminal commands that launched multi-stage payloads stealing credentials and crypto wallet data, with tradecraft overlaps noted with DPRK-linked UNC1069 and Contagious Interview activity.

  2. Mar 6, 2026

    SHub Stealer campaign adds wallet backdooring and LaunchAgent persistence

    Analysis of the macOS campaign showed SHub stealing Keychain, browser, iCloud, Notes, Telegram, and wallet data, backdooring Electron-based cryptocurrency wallet apps to capture seed phrases and passwords, and persisting via a LaunchAgent masquerading as Google Keystone.

  3. Mar 6, 2026

    Researchers identify fake CleanMyMac site delivering SHub Stealer on macOS

    By March 6, 2026, researchers reported that the fake site cleanmymacos[.]org was impersonating CleanMyMac and using a ClickFix-style Terminal command to install SHub Stealer on macOS systems.

  4. Mar 6, 2026

    Microsoft publicly discloses Terminal-based ClickFix and Lumma details

    On March 6, 2026, Microsoft publicly revealed the Windows Terminal-focused ClickFix campaign, including a second infection path involving batch/VBS/MSBuild execution and possible EtherHiding through blockchain RPC endpoints, along with defensive guidance.

  5. Feb 1, 2026

    ClickFix campaign deploys Lumma Stealer via multi-stage Windows chain

    In the observed February campaign, pasted Terminal commands decoded and launched multi-stage payloads that downloaded archives and tools, established persistence with scheduled tasks, altered Microsoft Defender exclusions, and ultimately deployed Lumma Stealer to steal browser credentials from Chrome and Edge.

  6. Feb 1, 2026

    Microsoft observes Windows Terminal ClickFix campaign in February 2026

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed a widespread ClickFix social-engineering campaign in February 2026 that shifted from the Windows Run dialog to Windows Terminal, using fake CAPTCHA, verification, and troubleshooting lures to trick users into pasting malicious commands.

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ClickFix Social Engineering Drives Multi-Platform Malware Delivery

ClickFix Social Engineering Drives Multi-Platform Malware Delivery

Security researchers reported multiple active campaigns using **ClickFix** social engineering—fake error dialogs or verification prompts that trick users into manually running attacker-supplied commands—to bypass browser and download protections and establish an initial foothold. In one enterprise case investigated by **CERT Polska (cert.pl)**, victims were lured via compromised websites showing a fake CAPTCHA/“fix” prompt that instructed them to paste and run a **PowerShell** command via `Win+R`; the script then downloaded a dropper and enabled rapid follow-on activity that can scale to **enterprise-wide compromise**, including deployment of secondary malware such as **Latrodectus** and **Supper** for data theft, lateral movement, and potential ransomware staging. A separate ClickFix operation targeted **macOS developers** by cloning the *Homebrew* site on typosquatted infrastructure; the “install” command was subtly altered to fetch content from `raw.homabrews.org` instead of `raw.githubusercontent.com`, leading to **Cuckoo Stealer** deployment and credential harvesting via repeated password prompts using macOS Directory Services, with related domains tied to shared hosting at **`5.255.123.244`**. ClickFix was also observed as the initial execution mechanism for the resurfaced **Matanbuchus 3.0** MaaS loader, which uses deceptive copy/paste prompts and **silent MSI** execution (via `msiexec`) to deliver a new payload, **AstarionRAT**, enabling capabilities including credential theft and **SOCKS5** proxying; operators were reported to move laterally quickly (including toward domain controllers), consistent with ransomware or data-exfiltration objectives.

1 months ago
ClickFix Social-Engineering Campaigns Using Fake CAPTCHA and Fake Installer Pages

ClickFix Social-Engineering Campaigns Using Fake CAPTCHA and Fake Installer Pages

Security researchers reported multiple **ClickFix** campaigns that compromise endpoints by tricking users into manually executing attacker-provided commands rather than exploiting a software vulnerability. CERT Polska documented an incident response at a large Polish organization where a **fake CAPTCHA** prompt led a user to run a malicious snippet via *Win+R*, resulting in malware execution and suspected **DLL side-loading** from `%APPDATA%\Intel` (legitimate `igfxSDK.exe`/`version.dll` alongside a suspicious `wtsapi32.dll`). Investigators also identified additional suspicious DLLs in the user’s local AppData and recovered an execution trail consistent with a one-liner that fetched remote content and piped it into PowerShell (e.g., `cmd /c curl ... | powershell`). Separately, threat hunting research described a macOS-focused ClickFix operation using **typosquatted Homebrew** lookalike sites to present a “copy/paste” install command that runs in Terminal. The first-stage script repeatedly prompted for a password and validated it using `dscl authonly` to harvest working credentials before deploying a second-stage infostealer dubbed **Cuckoo Stealer**, which was reported to establish **LaunchAgent** persistence, remove quarantine attributes, and communicate over encrypted HTTPS C2 while targeting browser credentials/session tokens, Keychain data, notes/messaging artifacts, VPN/FTP configs, and cryptocurrency wallets. Both reports highlight ClickFix as an increasingly common, opportunistic initial access technique that scales by abusing trusted user workflows on Windows and macOS.

1 months ago
ClickFix macOS Campaign Abuses Script Editor to Deploy Atomic Stealer

ClickFix macOS Campaign Abuses Script Editor to Deploy Atomic Stealer

Researchers identified a **ClickFix-style** campaign targeting macOS users that swaps Terminal-based execution for **Script Editor** to bypass newer Apple protections. Victims are lured to fake Apple-themed pages such as “Reclaim disk space on your Mac,” which invoke the `applescript://` URL scheme and open Script Editor with a pre-filled AppleScript. If the user runs it, the script conceals a malicious shell command that decodes a URL, uses `curl` with TLS certificate validation disabled, and pipes the response directly into `zsh` for in-memory execution. The activity, discovered by **Jamf Threat Labs**, ultimately downloads and launches a Mach-O variant of **Atomic Stealer**, an infostealer built to harvest browser credentials, saved passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other sensitive data from macOS systems. Researchers said the campaign appears to be an adaptation to Apple’s paste-command scanning protections added in macOS 26.4 for Terminal abuse; while newer macOS versions also warn about unidentified scripts, the attack can still succeed if users follow the prompts. Reported infrastructure tied to the campaign includes `dryvecar.com`, `storage-fixes.squarespace.com`, and `cleanupmac.mssg.me`.

3 weeks ago

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