Remus Infostealer Used Ethereum Smart Contracts to Rotate Live C2 Infrastructure
Researchers mapped an active Remus infostealer infrastructure cluster that stores live command-and-control data in Ethereum smart contracts, extending the malware's use of dead-drop resolvers beyond Telegram and Steam. By querying contract 0x999941b74F6bbc921D5174A5b29911562cd2D7CF via a public RPC endpoint and tracking its DomainUpdated activity, they identified a previously unlisted live C2 at fightwa[.]biz:5902, following earlier values including chalx[.]live:5902. Historical updates showed the operators were rotating infrastructure through late April, and the newly identified domain resolved to 185.53.179.128, an IP already linked to Remus operations.
Further analysis tied the campaign to a broader, automated infrastructure spread across more than 15 ASNs, with notable concentration at Hostinger International Limited (AS47583) and Team Internet AG (AS206834). Investigators found heavy use of .biz domains registered in early March through Dynadot, shared certificate and hosting patterns, and four additional Ethereum contracts beyond the one first identified, bringing the total to five contracts used to publish live C2 information. The contract set showed an evolution from simple DomainStorage logic to more advanced DataStore variants with stronger validation, ownership controls, and gas-optimized stealth features, while one v3 contract included a Russian-language code comment that researchers said was only a minor attribution clue consistent with the broader Remus/Lumma ecosystem.
Timeline
Apr 30, 2026
Additional Remus smart contracts and infrastructure concentration mapped
Further analysis of the Remus campaign uncovered four additional Ethereum smart contracts beyond the previously identified one, bringing the total to five used to store live C2 information. The research also highlighted infrastructure concentration at Hostinger International Limited and Team Internet AG, with 185.53.179.128 identified as a likely central convergence or exfiltration server.
Apr 29, 2026
Researchers expose xlabs_v1 botnet infrastructure and protocol
Analysis of xlabs_v1 production and development binaries revealed 21 attack variants, a plaintext-framed C2 protocol over TCP/35342 using xlabslover[.]lol, and infrastructure concentrated in the 176.65.139.0/24 netblock in the Netherlands. Weak ChaCha20 implementation details also allowed recovery of the operator handle Tadashi, bot tag xlabs_v1, and an authentication token.
Apr 28, 2026
Research identifies live Remus C2 via Ethereum smart contract
By querying Ethereum contract 0x999941b74F6bbc921D5174A5b29911562cd2D7CF with function selector 0xc2fb26a6 through a public RPC endpoint, a researcher identified live C2 domain fightwa[.]biz:5902. The hosting IP 185.53.179.128 matched infrastructure previously associated with Remus, supporting attribution to the same campaign.
Apr 25, 2026
Remus Ethereum contract rotates to fightwa[.]biz:5902
Historical smart-contract activity showed the Remus cluster progressing from a test domain to chalx[.]live:5902 and then to fightwa[.]biz:5902. The latest observed C2 rotation occurred as recently as 2026-04-25, indicating the infrastructure was still active.
Apr 1, 2026
Researchers find exposed xlabs_v1 botnet directory
In early April 2026, researchers discovered an exposed open directory on 176.65.139.44 and used its publicly accessible files to reconstruct the Mirai-derived xlabs_v1 DDoS-for-hire operation. The malware was found targeting internet-exposed Android Debug Bridge services on TCP/5555 and supporting multiple architectures.
Mar 1, 2026
Remus infrastructure domains registered in early March
The Remus infostealer campaign registered many .biz domains around the same time in early March 2026 through Dynadot. Shared certificate and hosting traits suggested an automated infrastructure setup.
Sep 1, 2025
Researchers trace Remus to September 2025 Tenzor test builds
Gen Threat Labs reported that Remus could be traced to September 2025 test builds labeled Tenzor and assessed it as a new 64-bit variant closely derived from Lumma Stealer. The analysis also highlighted inherited Chromium key-theft techniques and EtherHiding-based C2 resolution, indicating Remus evolved from the Lumma ecosystem rather than appearing suddenly in 2026.
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